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In recent years there has been a surge of quantitative studies evaluating alternative strategies
for monetary policy in a wide variety of macroeconomic models.1 The strategies considered
in this literature include rules for setting the policy instrument|usually a short-term nom-
inal interest rate|in response to recent outcomes for a limited number of key variables, for
example output and inﬂation such as the well-known Taylor (1993) rule, rules for setting the
interest rate in response to a forecast of inﬂation, and so-called "forecast targeting" rules
that assign a loss function to deviations of the forecast from target. While outcome-based
rules express the interest rate as an explicit function of available information, forecast-based
rules are equilibrium relations which require a forecasting model in order to generate an in-
terest rate prescription. Thus, the success of a specic forecast-based rule in actual practice
is likely to depend on the accuracy of the underlying forecasting model. The quantitative
evaluations in the literature, however, have typically restricted attention to the authors'
preferred macroeconomic model, and may have advocated rules that perform well in that
specic model but would perform quite poorly in other models.
In this paper, we compare the performance of outcome- and forecast-based rules in four
dierent macro-econometric models of the U.S. economy and investigate directly how robust
these rules are to model uncertainty. In doing so we build on earlier work regarding the ro-
bustness of simple versus complicated outcome-based rules in Levin, Wieland and Williams
(1999). The four models that we consider are the Fuhrer-Moore (1995) model (henceforth
referred to as the FM model), the MSR model of Orphanides and Wieland (1998), Taylor's
(1993b) Multi-Country Model (henceforth TAYMCM) and the FRB sta model (cf. Bray-
ton et al. 1997a). All four models incorporate the assumptions of rational expectations2
1Recent contributions to this literature include among others Ball (1999), Batini and Haldane (1999),
Black et al. (1998), Fuhrer (1997), Laxton, Isard and Eliasson (1999), Lowe and Ellis (1997), McCallum and
Nelson (1998), Orphanides (1999), Orphanides, Small, Wieland and Wilcox (1998), Rudebusch and Svensson
(1999), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), (1999), Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (1998) and Williams (1999).
2Policy rule analysis using traditional backward-looking models is particularly prone to the Lucas Critique
(1976), but to the extent that our models are interpreted as reduced-form specications of optimizing models
it applies to them too.
1short-run nominal inertia, and long-run monetary neutrality, but dier in many other re-
spects, including the dynamics of output and inﬂation, the degree of disaggregation, model
size and estimation period.
As far as forecast-based rules are concerned, we focus on instrument rules, which set
the interest rate as an explicit function of the model-based inﬂation forecast. Of course,
deriving this forecast also requires an assumption regarding future policy. Both, constant-
interest rate as well rule-consistent forecasts have been considered in the literature. In the
following we focus on rule-consistent forecasts, which are the optimal forecast within the
connes of each model. We do not study another type of forecast-based rule, which has
been discussed in the literature under the name of "forecast targeting rules".3
Forecast-based instrument rules seem to have received considerable attention at several
inﬂation-targeting central banks that have adopted an explicit inﬂation-targeting frame-
work. For example, researchers at the Bank of England4, the Bank of Canada5 and the
Reserve Bank of Australia6 have advocated such forecast-based interest rate rules. Specic
parameterizations of inﬂation-forecast-based instrument rules are being used both at the
Bank of Canada and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand7 in economic forecasting and policy
analysis. Recent work by Clarida, Gali and Gertler(1997), (1998) and Orphanides (1998)
suggests that an interest rate rule that responds to inﬂation and output forecasts as well as
the lagged interest rate provides a good description of federals funds rate behavior in the
U.S.A. over the 1980s and 1990s.
The potential advantages of forecast-based interest rate rules, and in particular rules
that respond exclusively to an inﬂation forecast are summarized nicely by Batini and Hal-
3The distinction between these two types of forecast-based rules is made very clearly in Rudebusch and
Svensson (1999) and Svensson (1999). "Forecast targeting" rules in the terminology of Rudebusch and
Svensson assign a loss function over deviations of the forecast from target. For a given model, such a
"targeting" rule denes an optimal interest rate reaction function, which sets the interest rate in response
to all relevant state variables of the model. In this respect, it is similar to the complicated outcome-based
rules we investigated in Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999), albeit with a dierent loss function.
4See Haldane (1995), Batini and Haldane (1999) and Batini and Nelson (1999))
5See Black, Macklem and Rose (1998) and Amano, Coletti and Macklem (1999)
6See de Brouwer and Ellis (1998)
7See Coletti, Hunt, Rose and Tetlow (1996) and Black et al.(1997) respectively.
2dane (1998) from the Bank of England, who note that these rules are lag-, information-
and output-encompassing. In other words, forecast-based rules are preemptive and can
account for policy transmission lags (lag-encompassing), by responding to forecasts of in-
ﬂation these rules may well embody all relevant information on the state of the economy
(information-encompassing), and given an appropriate combination of response coecient
and forecast horizon these rules may be eective in stabilizing both, inﬂation and output
(output-encompassing). Furthermore, proponents of forecast-based interest rate rules have
argued that they are more robust than outcome-based interest rate rules such as the Taylor
rule, because the inﬂation forecast will also take into account information regarding the
structure of the economy (see Isard, Laxton and Eliasson (1999)).
We reconsider these proposed advantages of forecast-based interest rate rules in our four
models using the same methodology as in Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999).8 We assume
the objective of policy is to minimize the weighted sum of the unconditional variances of the
inﬂation rate and the output gap (the percent deviation of GDP from its potential level).
In addition, we allow interest rate volatility to enter into the policymakers' optimization
problem. The funds rate is set according to a time-invariant policy rule. For a given model
and a particular class of policy rules, we rst determine the region of the parameter space
for which the policy rules generate unique equilibria. Then, we compute the policy frontier
for this class of rules, which traces out the best obtainable outcomes in terms of inﬂation,
output, and funds rate volatility. We refer to the policy rules underlying such a frontier
as "optimal" in the sense that these rules represent solutions to the specied constrained
optimization problem. Finally, we evaluate robustness to model uncertainty by taking the
rules that perform well in one model and assessing their performance in each of the other
three models. We consider both, the case where the rules make use of rule- and model-
8In the past, this type of policy rule analysis using rational expectations models was hampered by the
computational cost in solving and computing moments of models with more than a small number of equations.
Analysis in large-scale models was generally limited to comparing a small set of policy regimes as in Bryant
(1989), Bryant (1993), and Taylor (1993b). Increases in computer speed and the development of ecient
solution algorithms have made the computation of optimal policies in large linear rational expectations
models feasible.
3consistent forecasts, and the case where the forecast is based on an the wrong model of the
economy.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description
of the four models. Section 3 reviews alternative forecast-based interest rate rules from
the literature and presents the macroeconomic outcomes resulting from each of these rules
in our four models. The methodology for evaluating the performance of policy rules is
outlined in section 4. Section 5 compares the performance and properties of optimized
simple forecast-based and outcome-based policy rules. Section 6 proves an assessment of
the robustness of these rules under model uncertainty. Conclusions then follow. Two
appendices provide a detailed summary of the structure of the four dierent models and a
mathematical description of the evaluation methodology.
2 The Dependence of Forecasts on Model Structure
The four models that we consider in this paper share some important similarities. For
example, in each model expectations in nancial, labor and goods markets are formed in a
forward-looking (rational) manner taking into account the policy rule pursued by the central
bank. Furthermore, all models are characterized by short-run nominal inertia, typically due
to some form of wage or price contracts, which induces short-run real eects of monetary
policy. In the long-run however, monetary policy is neutral and all four models incorporate
a long-run vertical Phillips curve.
The four models dier in important ways, however, making them useful tools for eval-
uating the robustness of alternative monetary policy rules. The specication of wage and
price dynamics; the level of aggregation for expenditures, prices, employment and the exter-
nal sector; the forward-looking elements of the expenditure block as well as the estimation
period and methodology all dier across the four models. These dierences are summarized
in Table 1 [to be added] and discussed in further detail in Appendix 1 of this paper.
As a consequence of dierences in specication and parameter estimates, the behavior
of output and inﬂation in the four models diers substantially even when monetary policy is
4assumed to follow the same rule in each model. To illustrate these dierences, we compute
the unconditional autocorrelations of output and inﬂation as well as the impulse responses of
these two variables to an interest rate shock in each model assuming a common benchmark
policy rule. The rule we use for this purpose is an interest rate reaction function, which
was estimated using quarterly U.S. data over the sample period 1980Q1 to 1998Q4:9












yt−1 + ui;t (1)
 R2 = :930, DW =2 :50
where rt is the federal funds rate, 
(4)
t is the four-quarter moving average of the inﬂation
rate, and yt is the current output gap.
With interest rate behavior determined by this reaction function, we compute the dy-
namic properties inﬂation and output in each model using the solution methods described
in Section 3 below. The inﬂation autocorrelograms are depicted the in the upper left panel
of Figure 1. Inﬂation is highly persistent in the FM and MSR models, a feature of the
overlapping relative wage contract that Fuhrer and Moore (1995) have emphasized. The
FRB model exhibits somewhat less inﬂation persistence, but by far the least degree of in-
ﬂation persistence is found in TAYMCM, in which the inﬂation autocorrelogram falls below
zero after only four quarters. Even when combined with some inertia in price markups,
the staggered nominal wage contract specication in TAYMCM delivers relatively low in-
ﬂation persistence. The right panel of Figure 1 depicts the output gap autocorrelograms
for each model. In the FM model, the output gap is extremely persistent and displays some
"over-shooting" in that the autocorrelation turns negative after ve years. The FRB model
output gap displays considerably less persistence and slightly more over-shooting than the
FM model. In the MSR and TAYMCM model, which use similar aggregate demand spec-
ications, the degree of output gap persistence relatively low. Given these dierences in
serial correlation patterns, inﬂation and output forecasts generated in the four models will
dier substantially even under the same policy rule.
9This rule is close to the one used in Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999) and estimated by Orphanides
and Wieland (1998). We have simply extended the estimation period by two years up to the end of 1998.
5In designing a forecast-based interest rate rule that performs well, the time horizon for
the relevant forecast is a key policy parameter, which depends crucially on the transmission
lags of monetary policy. The impulse responses of output and inﬂation to a one-percentage-
point interest rate shock to the estimated reaction function shown in the lower panels of
Figure 1 indicate the dierences in policy transmission lags across our four models. The
lag until policy has its maximum eect, the magnitude of this eect, and its persistence
dier quite a bit across the models. As shown in the lower right panel, the maximum
eect of the increase in interest rates on output in TAYMCM and MSR occurs relatively
quickly, in about three quarters, after the original policy shock. Output then returns close to
potential by the end of the second year. The maximum eect is much larger in the FRB and
TAYMCM models than in the FM and MSR models. There is a slight overshooting eect
in MSR in the third year. In FM and FRB the maximum eect on output is only achieved
by the middle of the second year. While the output response is of similar persistence, the
magnitude of the eect is more than twice as big in the FRB model. The time lag until
the maximum eect of interest rate changes is felt on inﬂation, is, not surprisingly, a bit
longer than in the case of the output gap. As shown in the lower left panel of Figure 1,t h e
maximum eect on inﬂation in the TAYMCM and MSR models is achieved in the fourth
quarter, while it takes 6 and 10 quarters respectively in the FM and FRB models. The
eect on inﬂation in the latter two models is also more persistent.
These dierences in inﬂation and output dynamics and the impact of policy changes
across models suggest that the four models are well-suited to assess the robustness of alter-
native forecast-based rules under model uncertainty. Forecasts of inﬂation and output and
estimates of the impact of policy changes on these variables will be quite dierent in each
model even starting from the same state of the economy.
3 Alternative Forecast-Based Interest Rate Rules
In this paper, we follow the literature on forecast-based interest rate rules and focus pri-
marily on rules which respond to the forecasts of inﬂation and the output gap, and allow
6for some degree of interest-rate smoothing. This class of forecast-based rules (FB rules) is
dened by
rt = rt−1 +( 1− )(r + Ett+J)+(Ett+J − )+Etyt+K: (2)
These rules imply that the short-term nominal interest rate rt (the federal funds rate in
the case of the U.S.) is determined as a linear function of the lagged interest rate rt−1,t h e
J-period ahead forecast of inﬂation t+J (annualized) and the K-period ahead forecast of
the output gap yt+K. r denotes the unconditional mean of the equilibrium real interest
rate and  is the inﬂation target. We consider two dierent measures for inﬂation that have
been used in the existing literature on forecast-based rules: the four-quarter change in the
price level (4) and the annualized one-quarter change in the price level (1). Through most
of this paper we assume that forecasts of inﬂation and output are formed using the model
itself with the policy rule in operation, that is, forecasts are rule- and model-consistent. By
assuming away systematic forecast errors, we believe, we are erring on the side of favoring
forecast-based rules. Later, we consider cases where the forecasts are generated using a
misspecied model. We do not consider rules where forecasts are based on an exogenous
path for the interest rate as in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999).
Before investigating rules that are optimal in our models, however, we will consider a
number of forecast-based interest rate rules that have received attention in the literature,
and particularly at inﬂation-targeting central banks. These rules are summarized in Table
2. Most but not all of these rules are nested in specication (2). The rules dier with regard
to the forecast horizons, the degree of partial adjustment, the policy instrument variable,
the measure of inﬂation and the measure of the resource gap if it is included at all.
The rst two rules are from Batini and Haldane (1999), who analyzed rules in a small
forward-looking open-economy model of the Bank of England that is calibrated to match
U.K. data. The rst rule (BH-1) is the inﬂation-forecast-targeting rule that they use as a
benchmark for comparison. It uses an 8-quarter horizon forecast of the quarterly inﬂation
rate, a low degree of partial adjustment, and denes the instrument as the short-term real
7interest rate. The second rule (BH-2), which responds much more aggressively to a shorter-
horizon inﬂation forecast, was found to be particularly eective in stabilizing both output
and inﬂation in the model used by Batini and Haldane. The next two rules are taken from
Amano, Coletti and Macklem (1999) from the Bank of Canada. In this case the policy
instrument is dened in terms of the dierence of the short-term and long-term nominal
interest rates. Both rules respond to an 8-quarter-ahead forecast of the four-quarter inﬂation
rate with no partial adjustment. The rst rule, (ACM-1), is apparently used regularly as
a reference rule in the Bank of Canada's Quarterly Model. ACM-2 is a more aggressive
rule that is found particularly eective at stabilizing output and inﬂation in Amano et al.
(1999).
The next three rules use shorter forecast horizons of 1 year or less on inﬂation and
include a response to the output or unemployment gap. The rst rule (BE-1) is taken from
de Brouwer and Ellis (1998), who found this rule near-ecient in a small model of the
Australian economy. The other two rules are from Isard, Laxton and Eliasson (1999), who
found them to perform well in a small moderately-nonlinear model of the U.S. economy with
a time-varying NAIRU. The following three rules,(RS-1, RS-2, RS-3), are due to Rudebusch
and Svensson (1999) and quite similar to the BH-rules, except that the instrument is the
nominal short rate. Rudebusch and Svensson found that these rules, which use inﬂation
forecast horizons of 8, 12 and 16 quarters and allow for partial adjustment, performed very
well compared to a range of alternative rules in a small back-ward-looking model of the
U.S. economy.
The remaining three rules, that are due to Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) and Or-
phanides (1998), have been estimated based on U.S. data for the 1980s and 1990s rather
than optimized in some model. The estimation for CGG-1 and CGG-2 is 87:3 to 96:4 and
82:3 to 96:4, respectively. The estimate obtained by Orphanides (1998) is based on real-time
data on Federal Reserve sta forecasts of inﬂation and output gaps. All three estimates
suggest that interest-rate setting in the 1980s and 1990s in the U.S. is well described by a
systematic response to inﬂation and output forecasts of a horizon of four quarters or less
8and allowing for some degree of partial adjustment. For comparison, Table 2 also reports
some outcome-based rules, such as the rules due to Taylor (1993) and Henderson-McKibbin
(1993) as well as two simple rules that we found to be optimal in the FRB model and robust
across the MSR, FM and TAYMCM models.
Table 3 summarizes the macroeconomic outcomes in terms of the standard deviations
of the output gap, the quarterly inﬂation rate and the change of the federal funds rate in
the four dierent models. While each of the outcome-based rules yields a unique rational
expectations equilibrium in all four models, this is not always the case for the forecast-based
rules. As can be seen from Table 3 many of the rules that use longer-horizon forecasts such
as ACM-1, ACM-2, and the RS rules induce indeterminacy and thus multiple equilibria,
both in the MSR and the TAYMCM model.10 This result provides a rst clear warning sign
against the use of rules with forecast horizons that are signicantly beyond one year. The
only model in which all rules deliver unique stable rational expectations equilibria is the
FM model, which, as noted in section 2, exhibits the highest degree of output and inﬂation
persistence. We analyze in detail the stability conditions for forecast-based rules in the four
models in section 5.
The various rules deliver very dierent outcomes in terms of output, inﬂation and interest
rate variability. The dierences are related to the choice of forecast horizon, the inclusion or
exclusion of a resource gap, the choice of inﬂation measure, the degree of partial adjustment,
and the parameters of the rules. For the remainder of the paper, we systematically examine
the characteristics of ecient forecast-based rules in the four models and compare their
performance and robustness to those of outcome-based rules.
10Results from the FRB model are still incomplete. The FRB model includes a number of highly persistent
variables{stocks of capital goods and housing, government debt, and net foreign assets{absent from the other
three models (and nearly all rational expectations models used for policy rule evaluation). These variables
interact with forecast-based policy rules in a way that in some cases causes apparently reasonable policy
rules to yield multiple equilibria. This does not occur in the case of outcome-based rules. We are currently
investigating this issue.
94 Metholodogy for Evaluating Policy Rules
We evaluate the performance of alternative policy rules using policy frontiers, which sum-
marize the best attainable outcomes in terms of output and inﬂation variability for a given
class of policy rules. We present the policy frontiers associated with forecast-based and
outcome-based rules in inﬂation-output variability space with each curve corresponding to
a particular constraint on the variability of the rst-dierence of the funds rate. Through-
out this analysis, we only consider policy rules that generate a unique stationary rational
expectations solution. As the discussion of alternative forecast-based rules in the preceding
section indicated, not all rules are associated with a unique equilibrium. There are cases
which lead to explosive behavior and therefore no equilibrium exists, and there are cases
with multiple equilibria. For this reason, we explore a wide range of values for the response
coecients (;;) and forecast horizons (J;K) to identify regions of instability, before
computing optimal policy rules.
In evaluating a specic policy rule in anyone of the four models, we proceed as in Fuhrer
(1997) by computing the reduced form representation of the saddle point solution of the
model and then evaluating an analytic expression for the unconditional second moments
of the model variables. A detailed mathematical description of this methodology is pro-
vided in Appendix 2. For linear models, this approach yields accurate results far more
eciently than simulation-based methods.11 We compute the unique stationary rational
expectations solution of these models using the Anderson and Moore (1985) implementa-
tion of the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) method. Based on the reduced form of this solution
we then compute the unconditional contemporaneous covariance matrix of the endogenous
variables iteratively using a version of the doubling algorithm described in Hansen and
Sargent (1997).
For a given functional form of the interest rate rule, we assume that the parameters of
11To take advantage of these methods, we have constructed a linearized version of TAYMCM and a log-
linear version of the FRB model. We have found that these approximations have negligible eects on the
relevant dynamic properties of the two models.
10the rule (denoted by H) are chosen to solve the following optimization problem:
Min
H
V ar(yt)+( 1− )Va r(t)( 3 )
s.t. ~ x = P(H)~ xt−1 + Q(H)et
and Va r(rt)  k2
where yt indicates the output gap, t indicates the inﬂation rate, and Va r(s) indicates
the unconditional variance of variable s.T h e w e i g h t  2 [0;1] reﬂects the policymaker's
preference for minimizing output volatility relative to inﬂation volatility. For the remainder
of the paper, we use the letter V to denote the square-root of the objective function for a
given policy rule, and V  to denote the square-root of the minimized objective, that is, the
constrained optimal value of V . The rst set of constraints represents the reduced form of
the respective rational expectations model with vector of state variables ~ x and the vector
of shocks et. The reduced-form parameter matrices denoted by P(.) and Q(.) are functions
of the response coecients, H, of the monetary policy rule. In addition, we constrain the
level of interest rate volatility by imposing the upper bound k on the standard deviation of
the rst-dierence of the federal funds rate. The benchmark value of k is set equal to the
funds rate variability under the estimated policy rule given in equation (1).12
To compute the policy frontier of each model for a particular functional form of the
interest rate rule, we determine the parameter values in the rule which maximize the ob-
jective function for a set of values of the weight  over the range zero to unity. Thus,
for a given form of the interest rate rule, the policy frontier of each model traces out the
best obtainable combinations of output and inﬂation volatility, subject to the upper bound
on funds rate variability. Henceforth, when we construct a policy frontier subject to the
benchmark constraint that funds rate variability does not exceed that of the estimated rule,
we refer to the resulting policy frontier as an E-frontier.
The constraint on interest volatility plays an important role in our analysis. All four
12This benchmark value of k diers across the four models, in part because each model has been estimated
over a dierent sample period and as a result generates a dierent amount of funds rate volatility for the
same policy rule.
11models exhibit a tradeo between interest rate variability on the one side and inﬂation and
output variability on the other side, even at levels of interest rate variability signicantly
above those implied by estimated policy rules or observed in the data. That is, the variability
of output and inﬂation can be reduced by using highly aggressive rules, but such rules also
induce wild ﬂuctuations in interest rates. However, in the case of optimized simple rules
which incorporate some degree of partial adjustment (>0) the improvement in output
and inﬂation stabilization that is possible is rather small.13 Furthermore, linear policy
rules which generate highly volatile interest rates are often not implementable in practice,
because they would frequently prescribe violations of the non-negativity constraint on the
federal funds rate.14 Finally, the hypothesized invariance of the estimated model parameters
to changes in policy rules is unlikely to hold true under policies that are so dramatically
dierent (in terms of funds rate volatility) from those seen during the sample periods over
which the models were estimated. For these reasons we use the above-mentioned constrained
in interest rate volatility in deriving policy frontiers and focus our attention on rules that
feature relatively moderate levels of interest rate volatility similar to what has been observed
in the U.S. economy. We then analyze the sensitivity of our results to changes in interest
rate variability.
5 The Performance of Forecast-Based Rules
5.1 Stability Analysis
One concern regarding policy rules is that they may lead indeterminacy (multiple equilibria)
or explosiveness (no equilibrium). In our past work on outcome-based rules, we found that,
for reasonable values of  and ,av a l u eo f slightly above zero was sucient to guarantee
a unique rational expectations solution in all four models. The results reported in Table 3
13See also the discussion in Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999) and Sack and Wieland (1999).
14In principle, we could analyze non-linear rules that incorporate this lower bound on interest rates (see
Orphanides and Wieland (1998) and Reifschneider and Williams (1999)), but doing so would substantially
increase the computational costs of our analysis.
12suggest that this is not the case for all forecast-based rules.
The existence of multiple equilibria in FM, MSR, and TAYMCM depends on the forecast
horizon and the parameters of the policy rule, with shorter forecast horizons reducing the
regions of instability. Figure 2 shows stability regions for the four models, assuming there
is no response to the output gap ( = 0). For this gure and the next two, the policy rules
are assumed to respond to the four-quarter change in the price level, (4).F o rF M ,M S R ,
and TAYMCM, the dark shaded regions indicate the combinations of  and  where multiple
equilibria exist when the forecast horizon for inﬂation is 20 quarters. The other contours
indicate the lower bounds of the regions of multiple equilibria for shorter forecast horizons
(indicated by the number on the chart). For example, in the FM model, the combination of
a forecast horizon of 16 quarters,  =0 ,a n d = 20 is stable, but yields multiple equilibria
if  exceeds about 21. For these three models, the basic pattern of the contours is the same:
long-horizon inﬂation forecasts are only stable if the inﬂation response parameter is small or
the gradual adjustment parameter is large. As noted, the analysis of the stability properties
of FRB under forecast-based results is still underway and results reported in this gure and
the next two gures on FRB should be disregarded until further analysis is completed.
The regions of instability in FM, MSR, and TAYMCM generally shrink the more policy
responds to the output gap. Figure 3 repeats the same analysis as in the previous gure,
but with the coecient on the output gap set to 2. In the MSR and TAYMCM models,
the regions of instability have moved up and to the left, relative to the case of no response
to the output gap. In these models, adding a response to the output gap aids stability.
For the FM model, the regions of instability changed, but no clear general improvement in
stability resulted. Figure 3 repeats the same analysis as in the previous gure, but with
the coecient on the output gap set raised to 5. The regions of instability in the FM, MSR,
and TAYMCM models have vanished for values of  below 3, even with a forecast horizon
of 20 quarters.
135.2 Optimized Forecast-Based and Outcome-Based Rules
In Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999) we found that simple outcome-based rules (OB
Rules) with optimized response parameters, that is rules of the type of (2) with the forecast
horizons J and K constrained at zero, and ,  and  chosen optimally according to the
minimization problem dened by (4), perform very well in terms of stabilizing output,
inﬂation and interest rates in our four models. In fact, complicated rules which respond
to all observable state variables, yield only small stabilization gains over such 3-parameter
rules and tend to be less robust to model uncertainty than simple rules. These earlier
results form a useful benchmark for comparison for the investigation of forecast-based rule
in this paper. Table 4 provides a summary of the characteristics and performance of
optimized outcome-based rules in the four models. For each model, we show ve dierent
rules that were optimized for the following values of  = f0;0:25;0:5;0:75;1g.I n e v e r yc a s e
the relevant frontier is an E-frontier, that is, the variability of the change of the interest
rate for any of these rules is no larger than in the case of the estimated rule (1)in the
respective model. In all four models the optimized rules incorporate a high degree of partial
adjustment. In three out of four models, the coecient  is close to unity. The parameter
 which measures the response to inﬂation deviations from target, typically decreases, and
the coecient  increases with  as output stability is weighted relatively more heavily
than inﬂation stability in the objective function. Because we restrict attention to policy
rules that generate a unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium, the unconditional
variance of inﬂation is nite even in the case where reducing inﬂation variability is not an
objective ( =1 ) .
To assess the potential advantages of forecast-based rules, in particular their lag-,
output- and information-encompassing features we have constructed the policy frontier for
rules in which, both, the response coecients ,  and  and the forecast horizons J and
K for the inﬂation and output forecasts are chosen optimally.
Figure 5 shows the policy frontiers in each of the four models. In each case, the
14solid line depicts the frontier for forecast-based rules while the dashed line corresponds
to the frontier for outcome-based rules. As expected the frontier is convex to the origin,
with truncated vertical and horizontal asymptotes as the objective function in (4) switches
from exclusive concern about stabilizing inﬂation ( = 0) towards exclusive concern about
stabilizing output ( = 1). As can be seen from the four panels in Figure 5, optimized
forecast-based interest rules yield only very small improvements over simple outcome-based
rules in our four models. In each model, the policy frontier associated with forecast-based is
rules is only slightly closer to the origin. Evidently, the advertised gains from basing policy
on forecasts are oversold; at least in the context of optimal rules in these four models.15
Each panel of Figure 3 also indicates the relative performance of the estimated rule,
denoted by the letter E. Because the estimated rule generates the same amount of funds
rate volatility, comparison of the estimated rule to the policy frontier is straightforward.
The estimated rule performs appreciably worse than the frontier rules, despite the fact that
the estimated rule incorporates an additional variable (the lagged output gap) compared to
the optimized outcome-based rules. As discussed in Levin et al. (1999), the performance
under the estimated rule is substantially better than the policy frontier that would be
achieved by 2-parameter rules (including Taylor's rule), which do not allow for any degree
of interest-rate smoothing ( = 0). The optimal value of , however, turns out to be higher
than the estimated value of 0.76 in equation (1), in fact, in three out of the four models it
is close to unity.16
Given the results in the literature on forecast-based rules, it may seem surprising that
we nd so little improvement over optimized outcome-based rules. Since other contributions
literature have focussed on rules that use the forecast of the quarterly inﬂation rate (1)
rather than the four-quarter moving average (4),w eh a v er e p e a t e dt h ea b o v ea n a l y s i sw i t h
the quarterly rate as the relevant inﬂation measure in the rule. Again however, we nd
15Note this result holds also true in some backward-looking models, e.g. Rudebusch and Svensson (1999),
where they nd small gains from optimized FB rules relative to optimized simple OB rules.
16For a more general discussion of interest rate smoothing and optimal monetary policy see Sack and
Wieland (1999).
15no major improvement in output and inﬂation stabilization as we compare outcome- and
forecast-based interest rate rules.
We have also investigated to what extent our results are sensitive to the constraint on
interest rate variability. So far, we have repeated the above analysis in the FM and MSR
models with an upper bound on the standard deviation of the federal funds rate that is
twice the value associated with the E-frontier. We nd that this allows small improve-
ments in stabilization performance under both, forecast-based and outcome-based rules,
but dierence between two types of rules remains very small.
These results imply that two of the proposed advantages of forecast-based rules, namely
their lag-encompassing and information-encompassing characteristics are quantitatively unim-
portant in the four rational expectations model that we consider. First, while much of the
literature on inﬂation forecast targeting has emphasized how important it is to pick the
forecast horizon optimally in light of the estimated policy transmission lag, we nd little
benet from choosing a forecast horizon greater than zero. This is the case, even though
we are careful to allow the optimal forecast horizon to dier for each of the variables and
for each dierent weight in the objective function. Second, as noted in the literature, rule-
and model-consistent inﬂation and output forecasts introduce information on all observable
state variables, on the future path of monetary policy, and on the structure of the model
into the interest rate rule. Nevertheless, our results show that this information induces no
major quantitative improvement in stabilization performance beyond what is achievable by
ecient simple rules that respond to recent output, inﬂation and interest rate outcomes
alone. To obtain a better understanding of these results, it is helpful to take a closer look
at the characteristics of the forecast-based rules that are optimal in our models.
5.3 The Characteristics of Optimized Forecast-Based Rules
The Optimal Forecast Horizon. In all four models, we nd that the optimal forecast
horizon for FB rules using the 4-quarter change of the price level as measure of inﬂation,
ranges from 0 to 4 quarters. There is no support for horizons greater than one year. As noted
16above the optimal forecast horizon for both inﬂation and output is chosen separately and
may dier for alternative weights on output and inﬂation variability in the objective function
(4). This is illustrated by the bar charts in Figure 6 for the case of the FM model. The top
panel of Figure 6 considers the choice of forecast horizons for a policymaker who focuses
exclusively on inﬂation variability ( = 0), that is, an "inﬂation nutter" in the terminology
of Mervyn King (1997). There are ve groups of bars in dierent shades of grey, each
group associated with a dierent horizon J of the inﬂation forecast, (J = f0;1;2;3;4g), and
each bar within a group associated with a dierent horizon K of the output gap forecast,
(K = f0;1;2;3g). The height of each bar corresponds to the standard deviation of inﬂation
under a rule with those forecast horizons and optimized response coecients. This bar
chart illustrates that the optimal combination of forecasts is a 1-quarter-ahead forecast of
the four-quarter moving average of inﬂation and the current value of the output gap. Of
course, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 6 this combination depends on the relative
weight . Once some weight is put on reducing output variability ( =0 :25), the optimal
combination of forecasts in the FM model turns out to be a 4-quarter-ahead forecast of the
output gap and the current value of inﬂation.17
Table 5 reports the optimal forecast horizons and response parameters for rules that
use the four-quarter moving average of inﬂation, (4), as the relevant inﬂation measure, and
correspond to the forecast-based rules frontiers in Figure 5. Table 6 reports on rules that
use the quarterly inﬂation rate, (1). Outcomes for ve values of the the weight  are shown.
Recall, that in all cases the variability of the change of the interest rate is constrained to
be no larger than in the case of the estimated rule (1)in the respective model.
As far as the rules using (4) are concerned, in most cases the best choice regarding
inﬂation is to respond to its current value not a forecast. Exceptions include the TAYMCM
model, where it tends to be optimal to respond to the two-quarter-ahead inﬂation forecast
and cases in the FM, MSR and FRB models when all the weight in the objective function
17Note that the height of the bars in lower panel of Figure 6 represents the value of the square root of
the objective function, which in this case depends on both, inﬂation and output volatility.
17is put either on inﬂation or output variability respectively. As to output forecasts, the
optimal horizon is one quarter in TAYMCM and usually also in MSR, two quarters in the
FRB model, and four quarters in the FM model (with the exception of the extreme cases,
 =0a n d =1 ) .
As shown in Table 6 the results regarding the optimal forecast horizon for rules that
use the quarterly inﬂation rate (1) dier somewhat form the (4) rules. In several cases
we nd longer forecast horizons to be optimal. For example, in the case of the FM model,
the optimal output gap forecast to be used in the rule looks 7 quarters ahead. In the other
four models however, the optimal forecast horizons for output and inﬂation remain between
0 and 4 quarters ahead. A comparison of the last two columns in Table 6 shows that
forecast-based rules that use the quarterly inﬂation perform just as well as forecast-based
rules which use the four-quarter moving average of inﬂation. Dierences in the expected
losses are negligible.
The Optimal Response Coecients. Comparing the results for forecast-based rules
in Tables 5 and 6 to the results for outcome-based rules in Table 4, we nd that the optimal
value of partial adjustment parameter  is larger in forecast- than in outcome-based rules.
For example, in the case of the FM model,  tends to be close to unity for forecast-based
rules that use the four-quarter moving average as the relevant measure of inﬂation. In the
other models the optimal value is even above unity, typically between 1.1 and 1.3. The
optimal partial adjustment coecients for (1) rules tend to be even larger than for (4)
rules. Of course, in a model with backward-looking or adaptive expectations such rules
would lead to explosive behavior as emphasized for example in Rudebusch and Svensson
1999). However, our nding of optimal values for  above unity coincides with similar
ndings in other rational expectations models such as Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
The optimal parameters on output and inﬂation in forecast-based rules tend to be quite a
bit larger than in outcome-based rules, even though the constraint on interest-rate variability
in the optimization exercise is the same. That the response to a forecast of, say, inﬂation,
is larger than to the current observation results from its tendency to revert back to steady
18state. Except for the case when  = 0 optimal forecast-based rules feature a nontrivial
positive coecient on the output gap.
The last two columns in Table 5 compare the expected loss under the best forecast-
based rule (with (4)) to the loss under the best outcome-based rules for each model and
each of the ve values of the weight . Not surprisingly, given the frontiers shown in Figure
3, the expected loss for forecast-based rules is never much below the loss for outcome-based
rules. To the extent that improvements are possible they are below 10% of the loss under
outcome-based rules.
Inﬂation Forecast-Based Rules and Output. In the results presented above, op-
timal forecast-based rules possess an economically signicant response to the output gap,
except when the objective is to stabilize only inﬂation ( = 0). A topic that has received
much attention in the literature on forecast-based rules concerns the need to include the
output gap explicitly in the interest rate rule. It has been argued that a rule, which responds
exclusively to the inﬂation forecast with a suitable choice of horizon may be eective at sta-
bilizing, both, output and inﬂation, even without an explicit response to the output gap.
To assess the potential stabilization loss that would result from excluding the output gap
from the rule, we replicate the optimization exercise, but this time constrain the coecient
 on the output gap to zero.
Except for the extreme case where output stabilization receives no weight in the loss
function, rules that do not respond to the output gap perform signicantly worse than
rules which do include a response to the output gap: We nd no support for the output-
encompassing characteristic of inﬂation-forecast-based rules. Table 7 reports the outcomes
from the experiment of optimally choosing ;;J,a n dK, subject to the constraint  =0 .
The comparison of the last two columns indicates that the expected loss under inﬂation-
forecast based rules that do not include a response to the output gap is generally more than
20% larger than under the best comparable outcome-based rule in all four models. The
exceptions typically occur when the weight on output stabilization in the objective function
is very small or nonexistent.
19Optimal forecast-based rules that are constrained to have no response to the output gap
are in most cases characterized by inﬂation forecast horizons generally much longer than
those of optimal forecast-based rules that do respond to the output gap. When the output
gap is excluded from the rule, the optimal forecast horizon in the FM model is from 2{5
years, with the latter gure an imposed upper bound on the analysis. In the TAYMCM,
FRB, and MSR models the optimal forecast horizon exceeds one year for some weights on
inﬂation stabilization.
6 The Robustness of Outcome- and Forecast-Based Rules
To evaluate the extent to which a specic class of policy rules are robust to model uncertainty
we take rules from the associated policy frontier of one model, and evaluate the performance
of these rules in each of the other three models. For comparison, we evaluate both the
robustness of forecast-based as well as outcome-based rules.
Simple Outcome-Based Rules. Table 8 documents the robustness of outcome-based
rules. The results conrm our earlier nding in Levin et al (1999) that simple outcome-based
rules are remarkably robust.18 The table is organized as follows. The rst ve rows consider
ecient outcome-based rules from the Fuhrer-Moore model and assess their performance
in the other three models, rst in the FRB model, then in the MSR model, and nally
in TAYMCM. Each of the rows is associated with a dierent value of the weight  in the
objective function,  2 [0;0:25;0:5;0:75;1].
The rst set of three columns summarizes the performance of outcome-based rules from
FM in FRB. The rst among these three columns with the heading (r) shows the stan-
dard deviation of the rst-dierence of the funds rate that obtains under these rules in
the FRB model. The second column with the heading VOB shows the expected loss re-
sulting from these rules in FRB. Finally, the third column with the heading V 
OB reports
the expected loss under the best possible outcome-based rule in the FRB model given the
18Note the only change in this exercise concerns the constraint on federal funds rate volatility that enforces
a standard deviation of the funds rate no larger than under the estimated policy rule. This constraint has
changed slightly since we have re-estimated that rule including two additional years worth of data.
20same value of  and using the standard deviation of the rst-dierence of the funds rate
reported in the rst column as a constraint in the optimization exercise. In other words,
the dierence between the two expected losses measures the deterioration in performance
that occurs when the policymaker believes the Fuhrer-Moore model to be an appropriate
representation of the true economy and picks an ecient policy rule accordingly, while the
true economy in fact corresponds to the FRB model.
Looking further at the performance of ecient outcome-based rules from the FM model
in MSR and TAYMCM, we conclude that these rules are quite robust to model uncertainty.
Except for two cases the deterioration in performance due to a mistaken belief regarding the
correct model of the economy always remains below 10%. A similar evaluation of ecient
outcome-based rules from FRB, MSR and TAYMCM respectively, that is summarized in
the remaining three sets of ve rows in Table 8 indicates that ecient outcome-based
rules from those models, are also quite robust to model uncertainty. In other words, these
rules perform surprisingly well compared to the best possible outcome-based rules in the
respective model chosen to represent the true economy.
Forecast-Based Rules. In order to assess the robustness of forecast-based rules some
additional issues need to be considered. While outcome-based rules simply respond to
observed data, the forecasts entering forecast-based rules require a model of the economy.
Regarding robustness, a forecast-based rule that is ecient in one model may perform
badly in another model, either because the response coecients and forecast horizon are
suboptimal, or, because the forecast itself is based on the wrong model. In a rst step,
we consider the case where the rule is taking from one model (the "policymaker's model")
and simulated in another model (the "true economy model"), but the forecast that enters
the rule is still generated from the "true economy model" model. In a second step, we
investigate the consequences from using model-inconsistent forecasts. In other words, we
simulate the rule that was optimized for the "policymaker's model" in the "true economy
model" assuming that the forecasts that enter the rule are generated by the "policymaker's
model" based on the data that is observed in the "true economy model".
21With Model-Consistent Forecasts. Table 9 reports summary results on the ro-
bustness of forecast-based rules which use the four-quarter moving average as the relevant
measure of inﬂation, ((4)) and use model- and rule-consistent forecasts. The results in the
table are organized in exactly the same manner as the results regarding outcome-based rules
in Table 8. Of particular interest again is the dierence between the column titled VFB4
and the column titled VOB. The two columns compare the loss under a forecast-based rule
with coecients and forecast horizon that were optimized in the wrong model to the best
possible outcome-based rule in the true model. Overall, ecient forecast-based rules from
each model tend to perform slightly worse in the other three models than was the case for the
outcome-based rules discussed previously in Table 8. There are a few more cases where the
expected loss is more than 10% above the best comparable outcome-based rule in the true
model and in a few cases even 20% above that. Examples, for which forecast-based rules
are somewhat less robust than outcome-based rules, include FM rules in the MSR model,
MSR rules in the FM model, and FRB rules in the TAYMCM. Nevertheless, in most cases
the performance of the forecast-based rules is still relatively close to the outcome-based
rules benchmark. Overall, these results suggest that optimized rules with model-consistent
forecasts are reasonably robust to model uncertainty within our four models. In the end
this may not be too surprising since the optimal forecast horizon in our models is very short.
Thus ecient forecast-based rules are not that dierent from the ecient outcome-based
rules, which we found to be robust.
We also assess the robustness of forecast-based rules that use the quarterly inﬂation rate
as relevant inﬂation measure. As noted earlier this alternative has been considered in several
contributions to the literature on forecast-based rules. Table 10 summarizes the outcome
of this investigation. (1) rules turn out to be somewhat less robust than (4) rules. In
several cases the expected loss is more than 20% above the outcome-based benchmark rule.
In fact, there are even some cases where no unique rational expectations equilibrium exists.
For example, in the case for ecient forecast-based rules from the Fuhrer-Moore model,
when the true economy is the MSR model. The rules which lack robustness use a long-term
22(at least for our models), that is 7-quarter-ahead, output forecast.
With Model-Inconsistent Forecasts. The above robustness exercise, in which the
policymaker uses an inecient rule that was optimized in the wrong model, but still gener-
ates the correct forecast using the "true" model, may be biased in favor of forecast-based
rules. The alternative assumption is that the forecast is also generated using the wrong
model. Our strategy for evaluating robustness of forecast-based rules in this case proceeds
as follows. First, we solve the model, which takes the role of "policymaker model", for its
reduced form given the policy rule optimized for this model. This reduced form includes
the reduced-form equations determining the forecasts of inﬂation and output, which enter
the policy rule, as a function of the models state variables. We then add these reduced-form
forecast equations to the model, which plays the role of "true economy". The inﬂation and
output forecasts in the policy rule are then computed based on the forecast taken from the
"policymaker's model" and the data generated in the "true economy" model.
Since the above procedure requires that the state variables from the "policymaker
model" also appear in the "true economy" model, we start by considering the smallest
one, that is the FM model, as "policymaker model". Table 11 reports the outcomes that
we obtain when we evaluate optimized FB4 rules from FM in the MSR model, using the
FM model to generate the forecast that enters the rule. In this case, we nd that the FM
rules perform noticeably worse in the MSR model than the best MSR rule which generates
a comparable degree of interest rate variability. For the dierent values of the weight on
output- versus inﬂation variability in the objective function,  the performance deterioration
is between 8 and 18 percent. However, comparing these results with the outcomes reported
in Table 9, we nd that the loss in performance is of the same order of magnitude as in the
case where we evaluated FM rules in the MSR model using model-consistent forecasts. We
obtained similar results when applying the optimal rules and forecasts from FM to the FRB
model (not reported). According to these two examples, model misspecication in forecast-
ing does not appear to signicantly reduce the performance of optimal forecast-based rules
of horizons of one year or less. Presumably, such misspecication causes greater harm for
23policy rules with forecast horizons of 2 or more years. We are currently investigating this
further.
7 Conclusion
Our analysis yields several conclusions regarding the potential advantages and drawbacks
of forecast-based interest rate rules. First, in all four models, we nd that forecast-based
rules yield at best only small benets in stabilizing inﬂation, output and interest rates
relative to optimized outcome-based rules that respond to inﬂation, the output gap and the
lagged interest rate. This is even true in the two large-scale models, which contain literally
hundreds of state variables and allow for signicant lags until the maximum eect of a
policy change on the economy is felt. Thus, as far as the potential advantages of forecast-
based rules are concerned, neither the lag- nor the information-encompassing feature turn
out to be of quantitative importance. Second, even if output stabilization only receives a
small weight in the policy objective, constraining the policy rule not to respond directly
to output causes a signicant deterioration in performance. Only if minimizing inﬂation
variability is the sole policy objective, that is if the policymaker is an "inﬂation nutter" in
the terminology of King (1997), we nd pure inﬂation-forecast-based rules to be ecient.
Third, we nd that rules which are associated with forecast horizons of two or more years,
often are not associated with a stable unique rational expectations equilibrium in our four
models. In these cases we nd the possibility of multiple equilibria due to self-fullling
expectations. Outcome-based rules however, are generally associated with unique equilibria
in our models, as log as they imply a nominal interest rate response to inﬂation of more
than one for one in the long run.
Regarding the robustness properties of forecast-based rules, we obtain mixed results.
Rules which are based on a rule- and model-consistent forecasts and involve response coef-
cients and a forecast horizon that have been optimized in one of our models, usually also
perform reasonably well in the other three models. However, the forecast horizon is typically
fairly short, between one and four quarters ahead, and the relevant measure of inﬂation is
24a moving average over four quarters. Forecast-based rules that respond to expectations of
inﬂation more than one year into the future, which includes many rules proposed in the
literature, generally are not robust to model uncertainty, owing to the sharp dierences in
output and inﬂation persistence in the four models we consider. By considering forecasts
that are model-consistent we have biased our analysis in favor of forecast-based rules. Fi-
nally, we have evaluated the additional risk, which arises due to the possibility that the
forecast itself is generated by an incorrectly specied model. We conclude that proposals
that advocate interest rate rules which respond to inﬂation forecasts alone with a forecast
horizon of more than one year should be treated with signicant caution.
25Appendix 1: A Comparison of the Four Models
This appendix provides a more detailed description of similarities and dierences be-
tween the four macroeconomic models, in particular regarding the specication of aggregate
demand, aggregate supply and the foreign sector. As discussed previously the basic features
of each model, including the level of aggregation, the specication of wage and price dy-
namics, the forward-looking elements of the expenditure block, and the sample period have
been summarized in Table 1. The behavioral equations of the FM model were estimated
using FIML, while a combination of OLS, 2SLS, and GMM were used in estimating the
parameters of the other three models.
Aggregate Demand. The FM model represents aggregate spending by a single
reduced-form equation corresponding to an IS curve. The current output gap depends
on its lagged values over the past two quarters and the lagged value of the long-term real
interest rate, which is dened as a weighted average of ex ante short-term real interest rates
with maturity equivalent to a 30-year coupon bond. The parameter estimates are taken
from Fuhrer (1997a). The FM model does not explicitly include trade variables or exchange
rates; instead, net exports (and the relationship between real interest and real exchange
rates) are implicitly incorporated in the IS curve equation.
The MSR model disaggregates real spending into ve components: private consumption,
xed investment, inventory investment, net exports, and government purchases. The aggre-
gate demand components exhibit partial adjustment to their respective equilibrium levels,
measured as shares of potential GDP. Equilibrium consumption is a function of permanent
income (discounted 10equilibrium xed investment is a function of output growth and the
real bond rate, and equilibrium inventory investment depends only on output growth. Equi-
librium government purchases are a constant share of GDP. Net exports are assumed to be
xed in the simulations reported here.
The TMCM model disaggregates IS components further; for example, spending on xed
investment is separated into three components: equipment, nonresidential structures, and
residential construction. The specication of these equations is very similar to that of the
more aggregated equations in the MSR model. In TMCM, imports follow partial adjustment
to an equilibrium level that depends on U.S. income and the relative price of imports, while
exports display partial adjustment to an equilibrium level that depends on foreign output
and the relative price of exports. Uncovered interest rate parity determines each bilateral
exchange rate (up to a time-varying risk premium); e.g., the expected one-period-ahead
percent change in the DM/USDollar exchange rate equals the current dierence between
U.S. and German short-term interest rates.
The FRB model features about the same level of aggregation as TMCM for private
spending but divides government spending into six components, each of which follows a
simple reduced-form equation that includes a counter-cyclical term. The specication of
most non-trade private spending equations follows Tinsley's (1993) generalized adjustment
cost model.
Each component has a specic ﬂow or stock equilibrium condition; for example, equilib-
rium aggregate consumption is proportional to wealth. Households and businesses adjust
their spending in each category according to the solution of a quadratic adjustment cost
26problem. The resulting spending decision rules are specied as forward-looking error cor-
rection equations: the current growth of each spending variable depends on up to three of
its own lagged values and on expected future growth in equilibrium spending, and responds
negatively to the lagged percent deviation between actual and equilibrium spending levels.
Exports and non-oil imports are specied as error-correction processes with long-run in-
come and price elasticities set equal to unity. Uncovered interest rate parity determines the
multilateral exchange rate, subject to a sovereign risk premium that moves with the U.S.
net external asset position.
Aggregate Supply. In FM, MSR, and TMCM, the aggregate wage rate is deter-
mined by overlapping wage contracts. In particular, the aggregate wage is dened to be
the weighted average of current and three lagged values of the contract wage rate. TMCM
follows the specication in Taylor (1980), where the current nominal contract wage is deter-
mined as a weighted average of expected nominal contract wages, adjusted for the expected
state of the economy over the life of the contract. FM and MSR use the overlapping real
contract wage specication proposed by Buiter and Jewitt (1981, 1989) and implemented
by Fuhrer and Moore (1995), in which the real contract wage, that is the contract wage de-
ﬂated by the aggregate wage, is determined as a weighted average of expected real contract
wages, adjusted for the expected average output gap over the life of the contract.
In FM and MSR, the aggregate price level is a constant markup over the aggregate wage
rate. In contrast, the output price in TMCM follows a backward-looking error-correction
specication: current output price inﬂation depends positively on its own lagged value, on
current wage inﬂation, and on lagged import price inﬂation, and responds negatively (with a
coecient of -0.2) to the lagged percent deviation of the actual price level from equilibrium.
Import prices error-correct slowly to an equilibrium level equal to a constant markup over
a weighted average of foreign prices converted to dollars. This partial adjustment of import
and output prices imparts somewhat more persistence to output price inﬂation than would
result from staggered nominal wages alone.
The FRB model explicitly models potential output as a function of the labor force, crude
energy use, and a composite capital stock, using a three-factor Cobb-Douglas production
technology. The equilibrium output price is a markup over a weighted average of the
productivity-adjusted wage rate and the domestic energy price. The specication of wage
and price dynamics follows the generalized adjustment cost framework used in the FRB IS
block. Wage inﬂation depends on lagged wage inﬂation over the previous three quarters,
as well as expected future growth in prices and productivity, and a weighted average of
expected future unemployment rates. Price inﬂation depends on its own lagged values
over the past two quarters, as well as expected future changes in equilibrium prices and
expected future unemployment rates. In addition, both wages and prices error-correct to
their respective equilibrium levels. As in the other models, a vertical long-run Phillips curve
is imposed in estimation.
Unlike the other three models, the FRB model contains a detailed accounting of various
categories of income, taxes, and stocks, an explicit treatment of labor markets, and endoge-
nous determination of potential output. Long-run equilibrium in the FRB model is of the
stock-ﬂow type; the income tax rate and real exchange rate risk premium adjust over time
to bring government and foreign debt-to-GDP ratios back to specied (constant) levels.
27Foreign Sector. Neither FM nor MSR explicitly include foreign variables; in contrast,
both TMCM and the full FRB sta model include detailed treatments of foreign variables.
TMCM features estimated equations for demand components and wages and prices for the
other G-7 countries at about the level of aggregation of the U.S. sector. The full FRB sta
model includes a total of 12 sectors (countries or regions) which encompass the entire global
economy. Because of the size of the model, the cost of solving and computing the moments
of the full FRB model is prohibitive. Previous investigations using TMCM suggest that
the characteristics of optimal U.S. monetary policies are not greatly aected by the precise
specication of the foreign sector (see Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999)). Based on these
results and the benets of reduced computational cost, we replaced the full set of equations
describing foreign countries in the FRB sta model with two simple reduced form equations
for foreign output and prices.
Appendix 2: Our Methodology for Computing Policy Frontiers of Linear
Rational Expectations Models
In this appendix, we indicate the methods used to solve each model and obtain its
unconditional moments for a specic interest rate rule. Then we specify the objective
function and constraints faced by the monetary policymaker, and describe how to obtain
the optimal response parameters for a given type of rule.
Analyzing a Specic Rule. Our analysis not only considers the forecast-based rules
in equation (1) but allows for a wide variety of rules, in which the federal funds rate may
depend on its own lagged values as well as the current, lagged, and expected future values














where rt is the federal funds rate, and the vector z is a set of model variables that enter the
interest rate reaction function. The lagged funds rate coecients are given by H1
j (j =1t ol),
while the coecients on other model variables are given by the vectors H2
j(j =1t om)a n d
H3
j(j =0t on). Henceforth we will refer to the combined set of coecients by the vector
H = fH1;H2;H3g. After discussing how to compute the moments of each model for a
specic value of H, we will consider the problem of determining the optimal value of H for
a given choice of the elements of z and the lead and lag orders l, m,a n dn.
As in Fuhrer (1997), we analyze the performance of a specied policy rule in each model
by computing the reduced form representation of the saddle point solution and then evalu-
ating an analytic expression for the unconditional second moments of the model variables.
For linear models, this approach yields accurate results far more eciently than simulation-
based methods. To take advantage of these methods, we have constructed a linearized
version of TMCM and a log-linear version of the FRB model; however, these approxima-
tions have negligible eects on the relevant dynamic properties of the two models.






Ajxt−j + Cet =0 ( 5 )
where x is the vector of all model variables, and e is a vector of serially uncorrelated distur-
bances with mean zero and nite covariance matrix Ω . The interest rate reaction function
comprises a single row of equation (4), while the remaining rows contain the structural
equations of the model. Thus, the parameters of the interest rate rule are contained in one
row of the coecient matrices Aj(j =1t oM)a n dBj(j =0t oN), while this row of C is
identically equal to zero.
We compute the unique stationary rational expectations solution to equation (4) using
the Anderson and Moore (1985) implementation of the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) method,
modied to take advantage of sparse matrix functions. The reduced form of this solution




Dj(H)xt−j + F(H)et (6)
where the reduced-form coecient matrices Dj(j =1t oN)a n dF depend on the monetary
policy parameters H as well as the structural parameters of the model. By dening the
vector ~ xt =( xt−1;::::;xt−N), we can express this solution in companion form:
~ xt = P(H)~ xt−1 + Q(H)et (7)






Using the implicit expression V0 = PV0P + QΩQ , we compute V0 iteratively using the
doubling algorithm described in Hansen and Sargent (1997), modied to take advantage of
sparse matrix functions. Given Vo, the autocovariance matrices of ~ xt are readily computed
using the relationship Vj = PjV0 .
The Optimization Problem. For a given functional form of the interest rate rule, we
assume that the interest rate rule is chosen to solve the following optimization problem:
Min
H
V ar(yt)+( 1− )Va r(t)( 9 )
s.t. ~ x = P(H)~ xt−1 + Q(H)et
and Va r(rt)  k2
where yt indicates the output gap, t indicates the inﬂation rate, and Va r(s) indicates
the unconditional variance of variable s.T h e w e i g h t  2 [0;1] reﬂects the policymaker's
preference for minimizing output volatility relative to inﬂation volatility. We constrain the
level of interest rate volatility by imposing the upper bound k on the standard deviation
29of the rst-dierence of the federal funds rate; as discussed below, the benchmark value of
k is set equal to the funds rate volatility under the estimated policy rule given in equation
(2). Finally, throughout our analysis, we only consider policy rules that generate a unique
stationary rational expectations solution.
To compute the policy frontier of each model for a particular functional form of the
interest rate rule, we determine the parameters of this rule which maximize the objective
function for each value of l over the range zero to unity. Thus, for a given form of the interest
rate rule, the policy frontier of each model traces out the best obtainable combinations of
output and inﬂation volatility, subject to the upper bound on funds rate volatility. This
approach diers slightly from that commonly found in the literature, in which interest rate
volatility is incorporated into the objective function and each policy frontier is drawn using
a dierent weight on interest rate volatility. The standard approach combines information
about model-imposed constraints on policy with policymakers' preferences regarding funds
rate volatility, whereas we prefer to maintain a strict distinction between the policymaker's
preferences and the constraints implied by the model.
To obtain a benchmark value of k for each model, we obtain the rational expectations
solution generated by the estimated policy rule in equation (2), and then we compute the
standard deviation of the one-quarter change in the funds rate associated with this rule.
It should be noted that this benchmark value of k diers across the four models, in part
because each model has been estimated over a dierent sample period and as a result
generates a dierent amount of funds rate volatility for the same policy rule. For example,
the moments for the FRB and TMCM models depend in part on shocks from the 1970's, a
period of substantial economic turbulence, while the shocks for the FM and MSR models
are from the relatively tranquil 1980's and early 1990's. Henceforth, when we construct
a policy frontier subject to the benchmark constraint that funds rate volatility does not
exceed that of the estimated rule, we refer to the resulting policy frontier as an E-frontier.
For a particular functional form of the interest rate rule, we determine the policy frontier
by solving the optimization problem in equation (8) for a range of values of the objective
function weight . For a given value of , we start with an initial guess for the rule
parameters, obtain the reduced-form solution matrices G and H, compute the unconditional
moments, and calculate the value of the objective function; then a hill-climbing algorithm
is applied which iteratively updates the parameter vector until an optimum is obtained.
Thus, to determine a single policy frontier, it is necessary to compute hundreds or
even thousands of rational expectations solutions at alternative values of the policy rule
parameters. Given our objective of performing a systematic analysis of policy frontiers for
a wide range of functional forms of the interest rate rule, it is essential to make use of
the highly ecient solution algorithms outlined above. On a Sun Ultra Enterprise 3000
computer about as fast as an Intel Pentium II 300 Mhz computer only a few CPU seconds
are needed to solve and compute the moments of a small-scale model like FM or MSR,
while solving a large-scale macroeconometric model like TMCM or the FRB model requires
about ve CPU minutes.
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34Table 1: Comparison of Model Specications
TO BE ADDED
For a detailed comparison see appendix 1.Table 2: Alternative Forecast-Based Interest Rate Rules
Generalized Interest Rate Rule
ratet = ratet−1 +( 1− )(r + Ett+I)+(Ett+J − )+(Etgapt+K))
Authors Instrument Partial Adj. Inﬂation Resource Gap
rate  I measure  J measure  K
Batini & Haldane (1999)
BH-1 rt − Ett+1 .5 1 quarterly .5 8 - - -
BH-2 rt − Ett+1 .5 1 quarterly 5.0 5 - - -
Amano, Coletti &
Macklem (1999)
ACM-1 rt − rl
t - - 4-quart.ave. 3.0 8 - - -
ACM-2 rt − rl
t - - 4-quart.ave. 9.0 8 - - -
de Brouwer &
Ellis (1998)
BE-1 rt 0 4 4-quart.ave. 2.8 4 output 1.0 4
Isard, Laxton &
Eliasson (1999)
ILE-1 rt 0 4 4-quart.ave. 0.8 0 unemp. .3 0
ILE-1 rt 0 4 4-quart.ave. 1.5 3 unemp. .0 0
Rudebusch &
Svensson (1999)
RS-1 rt 0.62 8 4-quart.ave. 1.97 8 - - -
RS-2 rt 0.71 12 4-quart.ave. 3.31 12 - - -
RS-3 rt 0.47 16 4-quart.ave. 7.8 16 - - -
Clarida, Gali &
Gertler (1998)
CGR-1 rt 0.67 4 4-quart.ave. 0.32 4 output .026 0
CGR-2 rt 0.84 4 4-quart.ave. 0.27 4 output .026 0
Orphanides (1998)
AO-1 rt 0.67 4 4-quart.ave. 0.21 4 output .1 4
Memo: Outcome-Based Rules
Taylor (1993) (TAY) rt 0 0 4-quart.ave. 0.5 0 output 0.5 0
Henderson &
McKibbin (1993) (HM) rt 0 0 4-quart.ave. 1 0 output 2 0
Levin, Wieland &
Williams(1993)
LWW-1 rt 1 0 4-quart.ave. 1.3 0 output 0.6 0
LWW-2 rt 1 0 4-quart.ave. 0.8 0 output 1.0 0
Estimated Rule (see (1)) (EST)Table 3: Performance of Alternative Forecast-Based (FB) Rules
Rule FM MSR FRB TAYMCM
y  r y  r y  r y  r
BH-1 2.79 2.68 1.15 1.15 0.67 0.27 - - - 3.44 3.27 1.39
BH-2 2.88 2.55 1.23 1.16 0.64 0.28 6.89 1.60 .44 3.27 3.01 1.41
ACM-1 2.66 2.45 2.16 m.e. m.e. m.e. - - - m.e. m.e. m.e.
ACM-2 3.08 2.05 4.72 m.e. m.e. m.e. - - - m.e. m.e. m.e.
BE-1 2.71 2.30 2.76 1.23 0.48 0.47 3.55 1.53 2.30 2.56 2.12 2.78
ILE-1 2.90 2.51 1.07 1.11 0.65 0.25 4.37 1.55 .58 3.10 2.76 0.76
ILE-2 3.03 2.30 2.13 1.20 0.55 0.46 5.80 1.41 1.30 2.91 2.50 2.12
RS-1 2.98 2.15 1.40 m.e. m.e. m.e. 5.27 1.34 0.79 m.e. m.e. m.e.
RS-2 2.86 2.17 1.28 m.e. m.e. m.e. 4.96 1.26 1.00 m.e. m.e. m.e.
RS-3 2.66 2.29 1.78 m.e. m.e. m.e. 4.97 1.25 1.85 m.e. m.e. m.e.
CGG-1 2.96 2.45 0.71 1.12 0.61 0.15 5.48 1.56 0.39 3.25 2.71 0.76
CGG-2 3.15 2.22 0.57 1.11 0.51 0.11 4.81 1.46 .26 3.19 2.27 0.50
AO-1 2.75 2.73 0.61 1.11 0.70 0.14 - - - 3.39 2.96 0.73
Memo: Outcome-Based (OB) Rules
TAY 2.68 2.63 0.75 0.99 0.70 0.30 2.92 1.86 0.90 2.89 2.58 1.58
HM 2.08 2.81 1.50 0.73 0.66 0.89 1.75 1.89 2.00 2.09 2.04 4.17
LWW-1 3.78 1.85 1.97 0.84 0.40 0.34 2.12 1.46 1.22 2.33 1.73 1.71
LWW-2 2.37 2.45 1.83 0.58 0.53 0.48 1.41 1.65 1.22 1.95 1.79 2.01
EST 2.85 2.23 0.94 0.99 0.49 0.61 2.75 1.57 1.24 2.59 2.04 2.63
Notes: Results from FRB incomplete, pending futher analysis of stability conditions under
forecast-based policy rules.Table 4: Characteristics and Performance of Optimal OB Rules
Model Weight Parameters Performance
    r y  V 
OB
0.00 .94 .52 .11 .937 1.85 4.17 1.85
0.25 .88 .54 .37 .937 2.13 2.78 2.32
FM 0.50 .87 .39 .54 .937 2.50 2.21 2.37
0.75 .87 .23 .61 .937 2.94 1.88 2.19
1.00 .83 .01 .65 .937 5.66 1.58 1.58
0.00 .89 1.41 .06 1.24 1.30 4.59 1.30
0.25 1.02 .98 .92 1.24 1.59 1.55 1.58
FRB 0.50 1.02 .59 1.08 1.24 1.72 1.27 1.51
0.75 1.02 .33 1.13 1.24 1.86 1.15 1.36
1.00 1.01 .05 1.15 1.24 2.31 1.08 1.08
0.00 .96 4.14 .02 .606 .21 2.42 .21
0.25 1.09 1.91 1.36 .606 .45 .67 .51
MSR 0.50 1.06 1.06 1.36 .606 .53 .55 .54
0.75 1.03 .59 1.36 .606 .63 .49 .53
1.00 .97 .04 1.34 .606 1.16 .44 .44
0.00 .92 2.77 .26 2.63 1.66 3.23 1.66
0.25 .95 1.05 1.41 2.63 1.79 1.82 1.80
TAYMCM 0.50 .95 .42 1.49 2.63 1.85 1.72 1.78
0.75 .94 .14 1.51 2.63 1.87 1.70 1.74
1.00 .94 .01 1.52 2.63 1.89 1.69 1.69
Notes: V 
OB: objective function value for optimal OB rule.Table 5: Characteristics and Performance of Optimal FB4 Rules
Model  Parameters Performance Best OB Rule
JK     r y  V 
FB4 V 
OB
0.00 1 0 .96 .51 .10 .937 1.84 4.17 1.84 1.85
0.25 0 4 .97 .86 .68 .937 2.13 2.78 2.31 2.32
FM 0.50 0 4 1.00 .67 .98 .937 2.48 2.21 2.35 2.37
0.75 0 4 1.02 .43 1.11 .937 2.91 1.88 2.19 2.19
1.00 4 0 .84 .01 .66 .937 7.13 1.58 1.58 1.59
0.00 5 4 1.40 7.68 .05 1.24 1.23 4.88 1.23 1.30
0.25 0 2 1.16 1.63 1.46 1.24 1.57 1.46 1.54 1.58
FRB 0.50 0 2 1.19 1.21 1.97 1.24 1.68 1.20 1.46 1.51
0.75 0 2 1.19 .74 2.16 1.24 1.81 1.08 1.30 1.36
1.00 0 2 1.20 .01 2.27 1.24 3.99 1.00 1.00 1.08
0.00 0 0 .96 4.14 .02 .606 .21 2.42 .21 .21
0.25 0 1 1.25 2.91 1.92 .606 .44 .66 .51 .51
MSR 0.50 0 1 1.22 1.71 2.01 .606 .52 .55 .54 .54
0.75 0 1 1.19 .99 2.03 .606 .61 .49 .52 .53
1.00 3 0 .97 .05 1.35 .606 1.17 .44 .44 .44
0.00 2 0 1.04 .90 .11 2.63 1.63 3.21 1.63 1.66
0.25 2 0 .97 .33 1.28 2.63 1.78 1.83 1.80 1.80
TAYMCM 0.50 1 1 1.31 .38 4.93 2.63 1.85 1.70 1.78 1.78
0.75 1 1 1.33 .21 5.10 2.63 1.87 1.69 1.73 1.74
1.00 2 1 1.35 .10 5.20 2.63 1.90 1.68 1.68 1.69
Notes: V 
FB4: objective function value for the optimal FB4 rule.
V 
OB: objective function value for the best comparable OB rule (with the same constraint
on interest rate variability).
Bold: value of objective is 10-20% greater than that of the best comparable OB rule.
Bold and Underlined: value of objective is more than 20% greater than that of the best
comparable OB rule.Table 6: Characteristics and Performance of Optimal FB1 Rules
Model  Parameters Performance Best FB4 Rule
JK     r y  V 
FB1 V 
FB4
0.00 0 0 .97 .45 .10 .937 1.85 4.15 1.85 1.84
0.25 0 7 1.27 1.95 2.07 .937 2.14 2.79 2.32 2.31
FM 0.50 0 7 1.35 2.11 3.66 .937 2.49 2.24 2.37 2.35
0.75 0 7 1.60 1.97 5.66 .937 2.94 1.89 2.20 2.19
1.00 2 0 .84 .01 .66 .937 6.80 1.58 1.58 1.58
0.00 2 0 1.19 3.73 .03 1.24 1.23 4.88 1.23 1.23
0.25 1 3 1.37 2.85 2.42 1.24 1.56 1.49 1.54 1.54
FRB 0.50 1 3 1.42 2.14 3.46 1.24 1.70 1.20 1.47 1.46
0.75 1 3 1.41 1.32 3.74 1.24 1.83 1.08 1.31 1.30
1.00 3 2 1.19 .01 2.26 1.24 4.72 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.00 0 0 .92 2.22 -.09 .606 .22 2.39 .22 .21
0.25 1 1 1.30 3.14 2.21 .606 .46 .67 .52 .51
MSR 0.50 1 1 1.26 1.76 2.20 .606 .55 .55 .55 .54
0.75 1 1 1.22 2.00 2.14 .606 .64 .49 .53 .52
1.00 2 0 .97 .05 1.35 .606 1.17 .44 .44 .44
0.00 1 1 1.16 4.39 .21 2.63 1.63 3.25 1.63 1.63
0.25 1 0 .98 1.32 1.27 2.63 1.79 1.82 1.80 1.80
TAYMCM 0.50 1 0 .96 .55 1.43 2.63 1.85 1.71 1.78 1.78
0.75 1 1 1.33 .77 5.00 2.63 1.88 1.69 1.74 1.73
1.00 0 1 1.36 .33 5.25 2.63 1.90 1.68 1.68 1.68
Notes: V 
FB1: objective function value for the optimal FB1 rule.
V 
FB4: objective function value for the best comparable FB4 rule.
Bold: value of objective is 10-20% greater than that of the best comparable FB4 rule.
Bold and Underlined: value of objective is more than 20% greater than that of the best
comparable FB4 rule.Table 7: Characteristics and Performance of FB4 Rules where  =0
Model  Parameters Performance Best OB Rule
J   r y  V 
FB4(=0) V 
OB
0.00 9 1.21 2.34 .937 1.85 4.12 1.85 1.85
0.25 18 1.28 19.90 .937 2.08 2.99 2.34 2.32
FM 0.50 18 .77 4.82 .937 2.34 2.63 2.49 2.37
0.75 20 .61 3.88 .937 2.61 2.46 2.50 2.19
1.00 20 .33 1.99 .937 3.42 2.37 2.37 1.59
0.00 5 1.37 7.44 1.24 1.23 5.00 1.23 1.28
0.25 6 .89 4.16 1.24 1.26 4.73 2.60 1.58
FRB 0.50 6 .88 4.08 1.24 1.26 4.72 3.46 1.51
0.75 6 .87 4.04 1.24 1.27 4.72 4.14 1.36
1.00 6 .87 4.04 1.24 1.27 4.72 4.72 1.08
0.00 0 .95 4.00 .606 .21 2.44 .21 .21
0.25 5 -.06 5.23 .606 .47 1.27 .76 .51
MSR 0.50 4 -.38 4.55 .606 .59 1.18 .93 .54
0.75 4 -.52 4.19 .606 .71 1.14 1.05 .53
1.00 3 -.62 3.57 .606 .98 1.12 1.12 .44
0.00 3 1.14 4.92 2.63 1.63 3.22 1.63 1.66
0.25 3 .73 3.40 2.63 1.72 2.68 2.00 1.80
TAYMCM 0.50 3 .58 3.00 2.63 1.80 2.58 2.22 1.78
0.75 6 .50 7.92 2.63 1.91 2.52 2.38 1.74
1.00 6 .45 7.36 2.63 1.93 2.52 2.52 1.69
Notes:  Value of J constrained by imposed upper bound.
V 
FB4(=0): objective function value for the optimal FB4 rule, with  constrained at zero.
V 
OB: objective function value for the best comparable OB rule with no constraint on .
Bold: value of objective is 10-20% greater than that of the best comparable OB rule.
Bold and Underlined: value of objective is more than 20% greater than that of the best
comparable OB rule.Table 8: Robustness of Optimal OB Rules
OB Rule  in FRB in MSR in TAYMCM
From r VOB V 
OB r VOB V 
OB r VOB V 
OB
0.00 .53 1.39 1.33 .13 .36 .31 .74 1.79 1.78
0.25 .72 1.68 1.60 .24 .57 .54 1.09 1.95 1.92
FM 0.50 .79 1.65 1.54 .32 .61 .58 1.29 2.00 1.95
0.75 .84 1.54 1.41 .35 .61 .57 1.35 2.03 1.98
1.00 .80 1.37 1.19 .37 .56 .51 1.39 2.10 1.99
OB Rule  in FM in MSR in TAYMCM
From r VOB V 
OB r VOB V 
OB r VOB V 
OB
0.00 2.11 1.68 1.65 .24 .27 .26 1.57 1.72 1.71
0.25 1.90 2.38 2.30 .46 .53 .52 1.95 1.84 1.83
FRB 0.50 1.91 2.49 2.32 .51 .56 .55 2.06 1.85 1.84
0.75 1.93 2.28 2.10 .52 .54 .54 2.09 1.84 1.82
1.00 1.96 1.71 1.35 .53 .46 .46 2.08 1.82 1.81
OB Rule  in FM in FRB in TAYMCM
From r VOB V 
OB r VOB V 
OB r VOB V 
OB
0.00 6.16 1.64 1.48 3.72 1.30 1.26 3.98 1.66 1.63
0.25 3.19 2.47 2.30 1.85 1.59 1.57 1.94 1.84 1.80
MSR 0.50 2.52 2.47 2.31 1.53 1.52 1.52 1.67 1.84 1.79
0.75 2.30 2.25 2.08 1.42 1.36 1.34 1.59 1.81 1.86
1.00 2.12 1.55 1.32 1.42 1.05 1.05 2.39 1.74 1.74
OB Rule  in FM in FRB in MSR
From r VOB V 
OB r VOB V 
OB r VOB V 
OB
0.00 3.68 1.54 1.55 2.36 1.29 1.48 .31 .27 .24
0.25 2.25 2.42 2.30 2.41 1.59 1.57 .64 .54 .51
TAYMCM 0.50 2.19 2.59 2.31 2.44 1.54 1.50 .66 .59 .54
0.75 2.23 2.52 2.09 2.49 1.41 1.34 .67 .59 .52
1.00 2.27 1.47 1.31 2.54 1.04 1.03 .67 .43 .43
Notes: VOB: objective function value for the OB rule optimized in the \wrong" model.
V 
OB: objective function value for the best possible OB rule in the \true" model.
Bold: value of objective is 10-20% greater than that of the reference rule.
Bold and Underlined: value of objective is more than 20% greater than that of the
reference rule.Table 9: Robustness of Optimal FB4 Rules
FB4 Rule  in FRB in MSR in TAYMCM
From r VFB4 V 
OB r VFB4 V 
OB r VFB4 V 
OB
0.00 .50 1.38 1.33 .13 .36 .31 .70 1.79 1.79
0.25 .90 1.63 1.59 .19 .62 .55 .75 2.09 1.98
FM 0.50 .88 1.60 1.54 .19 .72 .61 .60 2.29 2.17
0.75 .84 1.51 1.41 .19 .78 .62 .49 2.45 2.35
1.00 .84 1.39 1.19 .37 .56 .51 1.42 2.09 1.99
FB4 Rule  in FM in MSR in TAYMCM
From r VFB4 V 
OB r VFB4 V 
OB r VFB4 V 
OB
0.00 4.30 1.76 1.61 .32 .26 .24 1.43 1.73 1.71
0.25 2.04 2.36 2.30 .38 .53 .53 1.07 1.94 1.92
FRB 0.50 2.23 2.41 2.31 .42 .57 .56 1.01 2.02 2.02
0.75 2.30 2.23 2.08 .44 .57 .55 .99 2.08 2.09
1.00 2.39 1.71 1.29 .44 .52 .48 1.02 2.14 2.14
FB4 Rule  in FM in FRB in TAYMCM
From r VFB4 V 
OB r VFB4 V 
OB r VFB4 V 
OB
0.00 6.16 1.64 1.48 3.72 1.30 1.26 3.98 1.66 1.63
0.25 3.83 2.59 2.30 1.85 1.57 1.57 1.94 1.88 1.84
MSR 0.50 3.23 2.61 2.30 1.53 1.49 1.52 1.67 1.92 1.89
0.75 3.02 2.41 2.05 1.42 1.32 1.34 1.59 1.92 1.92
1.00 2.11 1.55 1.33 1.42 1.05 1.05 2.39 1.74 1.74
FB4 Rule  in FM in FRB in MSR
From r VFB4 V 
OB r VFB4 V 
OB r VFB4 V 
OB
0.00 5.05 1.60 1.49 2.35 1.25 1.37 .48 .24 .22
0.25 4.25 2.53 2.30 2.65 1.69 1.56 .63 .56 .51
TAYMCM 0.50 5.94 2.71 2.27 2.48 1.50 1.47 1.07 .57 .52
0.75 6.16 2.43 2.00 2.52 1.28 1.29 1.09 .50 .49
1.00 6.41 2.02 1.12 2.54 .93 .93 1.09 .38 .37
Notes: VFB4: objective function value for the FB4 rule optimized in the \wrong" model.
V 
OB: objective function value for the best-possible outcome-based rule in the \true" model.
Bold: value of objective is 10-20% greater than that of the reference rule.
Bold and Underlined: value of objective is more than 20% greater than that of the
reference rule.Table 10: Robustness of Optimal FB1 Rules
FB1 Rule  in FRB in MSR in TAYMCM
From r VFB1 V 
OB r VFB1 V 
OB r VFB1 V 
OB
0.00 .68 1.40 1.32 .14 .37 .30 .96 1.79 1.75
0.25 1.57 1.75 1.58 .14 .78 .57 2.07 2.27 1.83
FM 0.50 1.53 1.75 1.50 - m.e. -1 . 8 9 2.54 1.86
0.75 1.16 1.63 1.37 - m.e. -1 . 1 7 2.65 2.03
1.00 .84 1.40 1.19 .37 .56 .51 1.42 2.08 1.98
FB1 Rule  in FM in MSR in TAYMCM
From r VFB1 V 
OB r VFB1 V 
OB r VFB1 V 
OB
0.00 4.22 1.90 1.52 .40 .25 .23 1.74 1.70 1.70
0.25 2.34 2.39 2.30 .30 .55 .53 1.34 1.92 1.89
FRB 0.50 2.29 2.43 2.31 .35 .61 .57 1.12 2.03 1.99
0.75 2.29 2.22 2.08 .36 .62 .57 .96 2.13 2.10
1.00 2.44 1.73 1.29 .44 .52 .48 .99 2.14 2.15
FB1 Rule  in FM in FRB in TAYMCM
From r VFB1 V 
OB r VFB1 V 
OB r VFB1 V 
OB
0.00 3.68 1.70 1.54 3.01 1.35 1.41 3.96 1.68 1.63
0.25 3.54 2.66 2.30 1.79 1.60 1.57 2.28 1.83 1.82
MSR 0.50 3.49 2.69 2.29 1.52 1.52 1.50 1.91 1.88 1.86
0.75 3.11 2.48 2.05 1.44 1.35 1.35 1.74 1.89 1.89
1.00 2.11 1.55 1.33 1.42 1.05 1.05 2.39 1.74 1.74
FB1 Rule  in FM in FRB in MSR
From r VFB1 V 
OB r VFB1 V 
OB r VFB1 V 
OB
0.00 5.94 1.72 1.45 2.02 1.24 1.50 .45 .25 .23
0.25 2.52 2.40 2.30 1.59 1.62 1.57 .58 .54 .52
TAYMCM 0.50 2.13 2.51 2.32 1.54 1.55 1.50 .63 .58 .54
0.75 6.07 2.62 2.00 2.49 1.33 1.29 1.06 .54 .49
1.00 6.51 2.05 1.05 2.55 .93 .92 1.09 .38 .37
Notes: VFB1: objective function value for the FB1 rule optimized in the \wrong" model.
V 
OB: objective function value for the best-possible outcome-based rule in the \true" model.
Bold: value of objective is 10-20% greater than that of the reference rule.
Bold and Underlined: value of objective is more than 20% greater than that of the
reference rule.Table 11: Robustness of FB4 Rules with Model-Inconsistent Forecasts
FB4 Rule Weight  Performance in MSR Best FB4 Rule in MSR
From r y  VFB4 y  V 
FB4
0.00 0.13 1.15 0.36 0.358 1.51 0.30 0.304
0.25 0.35 0.75 0.49 0.566 0.71 0.45 0.524
FM 0.50 0.42 0.64 0.58 0.610 0.58 0.52 0.554
0.75 0.45 0.59 0.69 0.613 0.52 0.61 0.545
1.00 0.37 0.56 1.04 0.561 0.51 0.94 0.508
Notes: VFB4: objective function value for FB4 rule optimized in the \wrong" model, using
forecasts from the same \wrong" model.
V 
FB4: objective function value for the best-possible forecast-based rule in the \true" model.
Bold: value of objective is 10-20% greater than that of the reference rule.
Bold and Underlined: value of objective is more than 20% greater than that of the



















































































































































Notes: The top two panels show unconditional autocorrelations of output and inﬂation
in each of the four models. The bottom two panels show the impulse responses of output
a n di n ﬂ a t i o nt oa1P e r c e n t a g eP o i n tF e d e r a lF unds rate shock. Both, the autocorrelations
and impulse responses are computed based on the same interest rate reactions, namely, the






















































































































































































































Notes: For FM, MSR, and TAYMCM, the dark shaded regions indicate the combinations of
 and  where multiple equiilbria exist when the forecast horizon for inﬂation is 20 quarters.
The rules respond to the four-quarter change in the price level, (4). The other contours
indicate the lower bounds of the regions of mutltiple equilbria for shorter forecast horizons
(indicated by the number on the chart). Results for FRB are preliminary and incomplete
(the light shaded region indicates that no equilibrium exists for a forecast horizon of 20
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EFigure 6: Optimal Forecast Horizons in the FM Model
Optimal Lead Lengths in Fuhrer−Moore Model (l = 0)
Lead of Inflation (j)










































Optimal Lead Lengths in Fuhrer−Moore Model (l = 0.25)
Lead of Output Gap (k)
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